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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 930305-CA

:

MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for distribution of
a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1990) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by

refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror whose only
potential source of ~ias was prior employment as a police
dispatcher?
Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is
within the discretion of the trial court. As the reviewing
court, this Court "must 'presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary.'"

State v. Morgan, No. 910449-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah

App. December 17, 1993) (quoting State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,
906 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)).
See also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989).

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by

admitting defendant's photograph to prove defendant's identity
after defendant opened the door to its admission by using the
picture to cross-examine Detective Lucas about his identification
procedure?
The admission of relevant evidence is governed by the
abuse of discretion standard.

Defendant must demonstrate that

the trial court's decision to admit the evidence was "beyond the
limits of reasonability."

State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,

1241 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40
(Utah 1992)), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); see also State
v. Wetzel, No. 920466, slip op. at 3 (Utah Dec. 3, 1993)
("Deciding whether evidence is relevant ordinarily requires a
balancing of factors, and we will reverse a determination of
relevancy only if the trial court abused its discretion").
3.

Did the trial court properly limit irrelevant and

repetitive cross-examination of Detective Lucas?
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to limit
cross-examination under the abuse of discretion standard.

"The

trial judge has discretion to limit examination 'to preclude
repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation' or to prevent
parties from embarking on 'fishing expeditions'."

State v.

Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted).
See also Wetzel, slip op. at 3 ("Deciding whether evidence is
relevant ordinarily requires a balancing of factors, and we will
reverse a determination of relevancy only if the trial court
2

abused its discretion").

Furthermore, defendant must demonstrate

that any abuse of discretion by the trial court in limiting
cross-examination prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

State v.

Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977) ("[s]hould the trial
court err in unduly limiting the cross-examination such may not
be reversible error without a showing of prejudice").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right . . . to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed . . . .
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e) (4) provides that
a potential juror should be stricken for cause when the
challenging party demonstrates:
the existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the
prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the defendant, which relationship
when viewed objectively, would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror
would be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict that would be free of favoritism.

3

Rule 18(e) (14) states that a juror should also be
stricken if a party demonstrates:
that a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging . . . .
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 04(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with distribution of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (R. 7-8). A jury found
defendant guilty (R. 219). The trial court sentenced defendant
to 1-15 years in prison, a fine of $500 plus surcharge, and $500
restitution (R. 223). The court stayed the imposition of the
prison sentence and placed defendant on 36 months probation (R.
223).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 225).

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Defendant's Crime

Detective Edward Lucas contacted defendant's roommate
at the Grand Hotel to arrange the purchase of cocaine on January
31, 1992 (R. 376-777).

Acting undercover, Detective Lucas went

to the hotel, met defendant in the lobby and informed defendant
of the pending purchase of a half ounce of cocaine for $500 (R.
376-77, 380, 385). Defendant told the detective to return in 2030 minutes (R. 380). When the detective returned, defendant was
waiting in the lobby (R. 381). The two went upstairs to
defendant's room (R. 382). Once in the room, defendant engaged
in conversation with Pedro Garcia in Spanish (R. 3 83).

Defendant

then made a phone call and asked the detective if he had a
vehicle (R. 385).
Defendant, Detective Lucas, and Garcia drove in
Detective Lucas's truck to an apartment building in Salt Lake
City (R. 386-387).

Once there, Detective Lucas handed Garcia

five $100 bills (388).

Defendant snatched the money from Garcia

and closely examined the bills (R. 389-90, 437). Defendant gave
Garcia the money (R. 390). Garcia took the money, exited the
truck, entered the apartment building, returned and handed
defendant a package filled with cocaine (R. 390-91, 470-71, 437).
Defendant handed the cocaine to Detective Lucas (R. 438).
B.

Trial Court Proceedings

During jury voir dire, defendant challenged prospective
juror Scholle for cause based on Mr. Scholle's prior employment
5

as a police dispatcher (R. 347-48).

However, the court

implicitly found credible Mr. Scholle's assertions that his prior
employment would not affect his ability to be a fair and
impartial juror (R. 317, 348) Correction Sheet to Transcript,
attached as Addendum A.

Therefore, the trial court denied the

challenge (R. 348). Defendant peremptorily struck Mr. Scholle
(R. 153).
Detective Lucas testified about his undercover work and
his methods of obtaining evidence (R. 371, 373-376, 393-95).
Defendant conducted an extensive cross-examination of the
detective about those practices (R. 405-415, 423-427).

On cross-

examination, defendant elicited testimony regarding the
detective's picture identification of defendant (R. 439). On redirect, the State sought admission of the pictures elicited by
defendant on cross-examination (R. 442-446).

The court allowed

the admission of the picture only after cutting away the bottom
of the frontal view (R. 4 90) Exhibit 3, attached as Addendum B.
Defendant's closing argument emphasized the deceptive aspects of
undercover police methods (R. 577, 579-81).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly refused to excuse prospective
juror Scholle for cause.
fair and impartial.

Mr. Scholle indicated that he would be

Defendant does not assert on appeal that Mr.

Scholle was biased, nor did Mr. Scholle ever exhibit any signs of
bias.

Defendant based his challenge solely on Mr. Scholle's

prior employment as a police dispatcher.
6

Such a per se rule of

disqualification for undemonstrated bias is unnecessary and
unsupported by Utah law.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting defendant's pictures into evidence.

Defendant elicited

this evidence on cross-examination by questioning Detective Lucas
regarding his identification of defendant.

Defendant cannot

complain about evidence introduced when he knowingly elicited
that evidence on cross-examination.
Defendant conductec an extensive cross-examination of
Detective Lucas regarding the methods of his undercover work.
This cross-examination sufficiently brought before the jury any
bias or motivation to testify the detective might have. The
trial court properly limited defendant's irrelevant and
repetitive cross-examination.

Furthermore, defendant obtained

sufficient information from that cross-examination to argue his
view of bias to the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO REMOVE POTENTIAL
JUROR SCHCLLE FOR CAUSE
Defendant challenged prospective juror Scholle for
cause based on Mr. Scholle's prior employment as a police
dispatcher.

The trial court refused to excuse Mr. Scholle for

cause after weighing the credibility of Mr. Scholle's responses
during voir dire and determining that Mr. Scholle could be a fair
and impartial juror.

Defendant's subsequently removed Mr.
7

Scholle from further participation in the trial by peremptory
challenge.

The trial court, based on its determination that Mr.

Scholle answered truthfully during voir dire and that Mr. Scholle
was not biased by his prior employment, properly exercised its
discretion by refusing to remove Mr. Scholle for cause.
A.

Standard of Review

Whether to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is
within the discretion of the trial court. As the reviewing
court, this Court "must 'presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary.'"

State v. Morgan, No. 910449-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah

App. December 17, 1993) (quoting State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,
906 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)).
See also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989).
Furthermore, Utah cases hold that when a party moves to
strike a prospective juror for cause, the strike is erroneously
denied, and the party exercises a peremptory challenge to remove
the prospective juror, that prejudicial error is assumed.1

See,

e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); State v.
x

The State has consistently argued that this rule, announced
without analysis in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093
(Utah 1975), should be abandoned. An automatic reversal of a
conviction based on possible bias of a prospective juror who
never considers the evidence or participates in the trial is
unsound as a matter of law and public policy. The Utah and
United States Constitutions guarantee a defendant an impartial
jury, not an impartial venire panel. Utah Const, art. I, § 12,
U.S. Const, amend. VI. There is no indication in the record that
defendant was denied this right. The Utah Supreme Court is
currently considering the State's position in the capital murder
case, State v. Menzies, No. 880161. See Brief of Appellee, State
v. Menzies, No. 880161, 43-52, attached as Addendum C.
8

Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 883 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
1981); State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v.
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977).
B. Permissible Grounds for Removing a
Prospective Juror for Cause
In order to demonstrate a prospective juror should be
stricken for cause, the challenging party must demonstrate to the
trial court the existence of one of fourteen conditions.

Utah R.

Crim. P. 18(e) (1-14) .
Rule 18(e) (4) provides that a prospective juror should
be excused where the challenging party demonstrates
the existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the
prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the defendant, which relationship
when viewed objectively, would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror
would be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict that would be free of favoritism.
A juror should also be stricken if a party
demonstrates:
that a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging . . .
Rule 18(e)(14).
C. Defendant's Proposed Rule
Defendant urges this Court to adopt a per se rule that
anyone formerly associated with a law enforcement office is
9

inferentially biased.

Br. of App. at 10 ("The question that was

asked, and answer given, do nothing to dispel the inference of
bias raised by Mr. Scholle's employment in law enforcement
agencies.")

This type of per se rule of bias has no foundation

in either law or logic.
The general rule is that former police officers are not
considered to be biased jurors.
An analysis of the cases in which courts have
considered whether former law enforcement
officers are qualified jurors indicates a
consistent holding on the part of the courts
that a person's status as a former law
enforcement officer does not disqualify him
as impliedly biased from serving as a juror
in a criminal case.
Annotation, Former Law Enforcement Officers as Qualified Jurors
in Criminal Cases, 72 A.L.R.3d 958, 960 (1976).

If former police

officers are not seen as inherently biased, a former dispatcher
should likewise not be seen as inherently biased.

Cf. State v.

Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to remove for cause a
prospective juror who served as a highway patrol officer), cert.
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).

Here, Mr. Scholle was not a

"former law enforcement officer," but rather a dispatcher who was
never involved with investigating crime or testifying in court
(R. 316-317).
Defendant claims that Mr. Scholle's prior employment is
sufficient to show a "legal, business . . . or other
relationship" between Mr. Scholle and Detective Lucas.
Crim. P. 18(e)(4), Br. of App. at 9-10.
10

Utah R.

However, Mr. Scholle's

work as a dispatcher in Midvale cannot reasonably seen as a
relationship with a Murray Police Officer that would influence
him to such an extent "that [Mr. Scholle] would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict that would be free of favoritism."
Id.

Mr. Scholle would have been an unbiased juror.
D.

Trial Court's Voir Dire

The trial court specifically asked the jury panel if
anyone knew the detective and displayed a picture of the
detective to ensure there was no relationship between any of the
potential jurors and the detective:
The record may reflect each of the panel
members have had an opportunity to review the
photograph. I would like to know whether or
not any member of the panel knows or is
familiar with or has any relationship
whatsoever with the individual who is
depicted in the photograph, Det. Lucas, who
at this time went by the name of Bobby? And
if so, would you please indicate this by
raising your hand at this time. (Pause) The
record may reflect that there are no hands
raised.
(R. 273-274), Exhibit 1, attached as Addendum D.
Defendant's challenge below and in this appeal ignores
the trial court's careful voir dire of the entire jury panel2
and Mr. Scholle's repeated assertions that he would be impartial
and base his decision on the evidence presented (R. 256-57, 26567, 306, 309-10, 316-317, 326-27, 339-40, 342). He likewise
ignores the fact that the trial court specifically asked Mr.

2

The voir dire consists of 95 pages of transcript (R. 250344). The entire transcript of the two day trial is only 354
pages (R. 250-603).
11

Scholle if his prior employment would affect his judgment, Mr.
Scholle responded "[i]t wouldn't affect my opinion" (R.317)
Addendum A.3

Furthermore, defendant does not claim that Mr.

Scholle was biased, but merely asserts that there was a potential
or inference of bias.

Br. of App. at 10, 12-14.

This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently
held that if a prospective juror exhibits signs of bias that
counsel, or the trial court, must ensure that the inference of
bias is rebutted.

See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126

(Utah 1989); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451; Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768;
State v. Bovatt, 854 P.2d 550, 552 (Utah App. 1993), cert,
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d
860, 862 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 826
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

Here, Mr. Scholle's position as a former

dispatcher was insufficient to demonstrate bias as a matter of
law.

Furthermore, the trial court's careful voir dire

3

The State recognizes that the relevant portion of the
transcript records Mr. Scholle's response as fl[i]t would affect
my opinion" (R. 317) (emphasis added). However, after the State
questioned the court reporter about the accuracy of this
transcription, the reporter filed a correction with this Court
which accurately reflects Mr. Scholle's response as "[i]t
wouldn't affect my opinion." See Addendum A (emphasis added).
The State contacted defendant's appellate counsel and offered to
stipulate to a motion for a stay of the briefing schedule to
allow counsel to respond to the correction. Counsel indicated
that the correction would not affect his argument. See Addendum
E.
12

demonstrated that Mr. Scholle's experience would not render him a
biased juror:
THE COURT: Now, taking those
responsibilities into consideration, and
taking into cc :deration that Ms. McCloskey
has identified une potential that law
enforcement officers or police officers may
testify in this case, I would like to know if
there is any member of the iurv panel that
would give the testimony of a law enforcement
officer more weight solely because that
individual bore the title of being a law
enforcement officer or police would be in
uniform, cloaked with the badge of authority,
so to speak? But I would like to know if
there is any member of the panel who would
give the testimony of a law enforcement
officer more weight solely because that
individual was a law enforcement officer?
An [dl if so, would you please indicate this
by raising your hand at this time. (Pause)
The record may reflect that there are no
hands raised. . . . What I would like to know
is whether or not, members of the panel, any
of you have ever been employed in a law
enforcement capacity. Also, I would like to
know whether or not any of you have any close
friends or close family members who are
employed as law enforcement officers and if
so, would you please indicate this by raising
your hand at this time. . . [six potential
jurors indicated they fit this category]
(emphasis added).

THE COURT: Did I miss any hands raised?
thought I did. Mr. Scholle.
MR. SCHOLLE:

I

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Who were you thinking of, sir?
MR. SCHOLLE: I was employed 20 years as a
dispatcher. Ten years it was part-time
second job with Midvale City Police. And
then I worked eight years for the County
Sheriff's Department in Cleveland, Ohio.
THE COURT:

In what capacity?
13

MR. SCHOLLE: As a dispatcher and then twice
-- once for six months on a temporary job,
and then about a year with the Salt Lake
County Police as a dispatcher.
THE COURT: So the occasions that you were
employed with law enforcement offices or
agencies was as a dispatcher; is that
correct?
MR. SCHOLLE: It has always been as a
dispatcher, yes, sir.
THE COURT: Were you ever involved in the
investigative phase of any alleged criminal
offense?
MR. SCHOLLE: Well, I used to use the
computer all the time to find people.
THE COURT: Well, no, I want to know in the
capacity that you were employed working for
law enforcement agencies, were you ever
involved in the investigation phase?
MR. SCHOLLE:
THE COURT:

Of a specific crime, you mean?

Yes, sir.

MR. SCHOLLE:

No, never.

THE COURT: Did you ever testify as a witness
or anything of that nature?
MR. SCHOLLE:

No.

THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr.
Scholle, that you described would prevent you
from being fair and impartial if you were a
juror in today's case?
MR. SCHOLLE:

It wouldn't affect my opinion.

(R. 309-311, 316-317) addendum A, note 3 supra.

The trial court

believed these statements to be true and defendant offers no
record evidence to contradict that determination.
Subsequently, the trial court denied defendant's
challenge for cause:
14

And I am going to deny that challenge for
cause. I think he responded that he could be
fair and impartial. He was employed only in
a dispatch capacity, even though I would
imagine that probably brought him into
contact with other law enforcement officers.
The Court is not persuaded that is a proper
challenge for cause.
(R. 348).
Ignoring this entire line of questioning and the trial
court's finding, defendant complains on appeal that the court
failed to "further probe [Mr. Scholle's] attitudes and feelings
towards law enforcement officers" and that "[t]he rehabilitative
efforts in this case were inadequate, and at most pro forma."
Br. of App. at 10, 12. However, as demonstrated above, the trial
court conducted an extensive voir dire into any possible bias
towards police officers and determined that Mr. Scholle did not
demonstrate any bias.4
Given the trial court's correct determination that
prior employment as a dispatcher is insufficient to raise an
inference of bias, and the court's careful questioning about Mr.
Scholle's duties as a dispatcher, there was no need for
additional questioning of Mr. Scholle.

4

The trial court did not hesitate to strike two potential
jurors for cause when the court found a possibility of bias. The
court struck Ms. Billings for cause when he found her hesitation
to answer a question about drug victims to raise "serious
questions of whether or [not] she could be fair and impartial in
deciding this particular case." (R. 346). The court likewise
struck Mr. Nash for cause because "he indicated his step-son died
of an overdose and considering that this case involves a
distribution charge, I think that he is a proper challenge for
cause for those reasons." (R. 347).
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However, if this Court determines that the trial court
clearly erred by not recognizing an inference of bias, the trial
court specifically asked Mr. Scholle if his prior employment
would affect his opinion as a juror (R. 316-317) Addendum A.
This single question was sufficient to dispel any possible
inference of bias in light of the careful probing by the trial
court into Mr. Scholle's previous experience.

State v. Brooks,

No. 920853-CA, slip op. at 11 n. 4 (Utah App. October 29, 1993)
(noting that in Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929,
932 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988), that
this Court "held that 'the question asked by the trial court was
sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a
challenge for cause . . . " ) .

Therefore, no additional

questioning was required.
E. Defendant Waived any Additional
Questioning by Not Requesting Additional Voir
Dire
Furthermore, defendant never requested that the trial
court ask additional questions of Mr. Scholle.

He has,

therefore, waived any failure of the trial court to further
question Mr. Scholle.

See State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 83

(Utah 1988) ("We therefore hold that DeMille's failure to voir
dire the jurors on this quite foreseeable issue or object to the
trial court's failure to cover the issue constitutes a waiver and
bars inquiry into the bias question"); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d
130, 131 (Utah 1983) ("Counsel neither objected, reminded the
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judge of the oversight, made a new request, nor asked permission
personally to voir dire the jury under U.C.A. 1953, § 77-3518(b).

Such failure effectively waived the error . . . " ) . 5
Mr. Scholle denied knowing the witness and continually

indicated that he would be fair and impartial. (R. 256-57, 26567, 306, 309-10, 316-317, 326-27, 339-40, 342). Defendant's
position that Mr. Scholle violated his oath to answer questions
truthfully during voir dire (R. 253) is unsupported by the
record.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion by

refusing to strike Mr. Scholle for cause.
POINT II
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN ON APPEAL ABOUT THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE HE KNOWINGLY ELICITED
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
Defendant asserts that the introduction of his "mug
shots" requires this Court to reverse his conviction based on the
theory that the pictures brought evidence of his prior criminal
activity to the jury's attention.

Br. of App. at 14-26.

However, the photographs were only introduced after he questioned
Detective Lucas about the pictures.

Furthermore, the pictures

were admissible to prove identity since the question of the
identity of the person who participated in the drug deal with
Detective Lucas was defendant's main focus at trial.

5

The trial court did not limit voir dire. Specifically, the
court asked a follow-up question when the State was unsatisfied
about the effectiveness of a particular question (R. 322-23, 32425). Nothing in the record suggests that the court would not
have asked additional questions if defendant had requested those
questions.
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A. Defendant Cannot Complain on Appeal About
Evidence He Elicited on Cross-Examination
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. Barney,
681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984) disposes of this issue on appeal:
While evidence of the defendant's criminal
character may be, and generally is, excluded
under Rule 55 when such evidence is elicited
or offered by the prosecution to prove its
case-in-chief, the same evidence may not be
excludable under the said rule when the
responsibility for its introduction may be
traced to the defendant. . . . Under such
circumstances, the alleged error was invited
by defendant's own counsel, and thus
defendant is in no position to request a
mistrial.
Barney, 681 P.2d at 1231.

See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

1220 (Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when
that party led the trial court into committing the error"); State
v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1981) ("if the defendant
himself opens up the subject as to prior incidents, it becomes
subject to cross-examination and refutation the same as any other
evidence").
Detective Lucas did not state how he made his initial
identification of defendant on direct examination.

However,

during cross-examination of Detective Lucas, defendant questioned
the detective about the method used to identify defendant (R.
439-40)6:
6

0n appeal, defendant erroneously states, "Detective Lucas
positively identified Mr. Ramos in court, and that identification
was not challenged bv the defense." Br. of App. at 20 (emphasis
added). As demonstrated in this section, defense counsel based
her entire argument on the theory that Detective Lucas
18

MS. REMAL: You haven't participated in
viewing people in a line up to try and
identify which person was involved with Mr.
Garcia and the transaction in this case, have
you?
DET. LUCAS:

It wasn't necessary.

MS. REMAL: Have you viewed a photo spread, a
series of photographs, to see if you could
identify that person?
DET. LUCAS:

It took only one to identify it.

MS. REMAL: And what photograph was that?
DET. LUCAS: I am afraid that if I mention
that it may prejudice the jury.
MS. REMAL: Well, you saw a photograph of
only Mr. Ramos, would that be accurate?
DET. LUCAS: Yes, it was provided to the
County Attorney.
MS. REMAL: And you didn't see that in
conjunction with six or seven other
photographs from which you had to select one;
is that right?
DET. LUCAS:

That is correct.

(R. 439-40).7
On redirect, the State asked the detective how he
identified defendant.

Detective Lucas stated that on the day of

drug deal he found a prescription bottle with the name of Maximo
Ramos, he also discovered that the phone in defendant's room was
listed as "Rolando Ramos" (R. 442) . He subsequently checked

misidentified defendant as the person who handed him the cocaine.
7

Defense counsel must have known of the existence of the mug
shots. She filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Mr.
Ramos's prior convictions (R. 29). Therefore, counsel was aware
that the police would have mug shots of the defendant.
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"with other law enforcement agencies, who had a record of Mr.
Ramos and was able to come up with a photo."

(R. 442-43).

Detective Lucas then identified exhibit three as "a copy of the
photo that I obtained from an outside agency reflecting the
individual that had his residence at 510 New Grand Hotel."
443) addendum B.

(R.

Detective Lucas further testified that he

obtained the photo "[w]hen I had information that we did have
additional records of interacting with them, I would have ordered
the photograph at that time and it would have taken two or three
days to obtain it" (R. 446).8
In his brief, defendant suggests that this Court adopt
the three pronged test announced in United States v. Harrington,
490 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1973).

Br. of App. at 17-26.

However,

this case does not present a situation where that test applies.
As the Second Circuit noted, "if the defendant should take the
stand or be responsible, without proper reason, for placing his
prior record before the jury, then different rules would apply."
Id. at 495 n. 3.

This distinction has not been lost by the

courts defendant cites in support for adoption of this test. Br.
of App. at 17-26.

See United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207,

209-10 (1st Cir. 1978) (error where, on direct examination, "the

defendant never objected to any of this testimony elicited
to lay a foundation for the admission of the photographs. To the
extent that defendant's argument is based on the fact that his
prior contact with law enforcement was prejudicial information
that should have been kept from the jury, he waived that argument
by not objecting to this line of questioning. State v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989).
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government tendered into evidence the mug shot of defendant . . .
" ) ; United States v. Bowers, 567 F.2d 1309, 1314 ( 5th Cir. 1978)
(defendant "invited any error that occurred in [the mug shots]
admission . . . ") cert, denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978); Holsclaw v.
State, 364 So.2d 378, 379 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978) (error where State
introduced mug shots during case in chief); State v. Kelly, 526
P.2d 720, 729 (Ariz. 1974) (harmless error for trial court to
admit picture during direct examination of witness by state)
cert, denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975); People v. Pickett. 571 P.2d
1078, 1083 (Colo. 1977) ("The photographs were not introduced
into evidence on direct examination of Janet Little, but only
after extensive cross-examination concerning her photographic
identification of defendant"); State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258, 261
(Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (error where mug shots were introduced by
government in case in chief); People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395,
396 (111. App. Ct. 1973) (same);

Redd v. Commonwealth, 591

S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (same); People v. Travier,
197 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Mich. 1972) ("where, as here, defense
counsel has made an issue of the witness's ability to recognize
the defendant from the picture he was shown by police, it was not
improper for the trial court to admit the photos"); Sloane v.
State, 437 So.2d 16, 18 (Miss. 1983) (error where photographs
introduced during direct examination); Ingram v. State. 755 P.2d
120, 123 (Okl. Crim. App. 1988) (court recognizes that different
test applies when defendant takes stand); State v. Denson, 237
S.E.2d 761, 762 (S.C. 1977) (State introduced three of fourteen
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mug shots used by witness to make identification) but see State
v. Robinson, 262 S.E.2d 729, 730 (S.C. 1980) ("the defense had
placed great emphasis on [the] failure to identify [defendant] .
. .•

On redirect examination, the State properly brought out

[the] earlier identification of [defendant] . . .. The
photographs were introduced to show the jury that the
photographic identification was reliable).
B. The Identity of Defendant was the Main
Issue Below
Moreover, State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515 (Utah 1989)
deals directly with defendant's claim that the pictures were not
admissible to prove identity:
The lower court correctly ruled that the mug
shots were admissible for purposes of
establishing identity. Even though we
recognize that under Rule 403, they could
still be excluded, the mug shots here were
crucial in establishing the identity of
defendant, which was the main issue.
Id. at 517; Cf^ State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978)
("if evidence serves some legitimate purpose as to proof of the
crime, or in bearing on the credibility of evidence, the fact
that it may show the commission of another crime will not render
it inadmissible").
Defendant asserts that Albretsen is distinguishable on
its facts.

Br. of App. at 15-17.

However, as recognized by

counsel and the trial court below, the identity of the person
accompanying Detective Lucas to the cocaine buy was the crucial
issue at trial (R. 364, 377-82, 399-401, 439-440, 441-46, 490,
555-57, 558, 571-73, 575) . Defendant ignores this by arguing on
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appeal that his alibi theory meant that identification was not an
issue below.

Br. of App. at 16. However, any alibi theory

places the identity of the person who handed Detective Lucas the
cocaine directly at issue.
Moreover, defendant's entire defense was based on his
theory that "[t]hey have the wrong guy."

(R. 362). During

opening argument, defense counsel stated "Maximo was not with
Det. Lucas selling drugs. He wasn't riding around with him
trying to help him find a place to buy drugs."

(R. 364).

Defendant further argued in closing argument that, "Det. Lucas
tells us that Maximo was there with him, with this other fellow
Pedro Garcia, and there was this drug transaction that took
place.

Maria and Maximo tell us that is not the case at all."

(R. 575). Therefore, the only issue at trial was whether or not
Detective Lucas's identification of defendant was accurate.
The Utah Supreme Court's holdings in Albretsen and
Barney dispose of this issue on appeal.

The evidence was

introduced in response to defendant's cross-examination of
Detective Lucas and for the purpose of identifying defendant as
the distributor of cocaine.

The trial court properly admitted

this evidence.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED IRRELEVANT
AND REPETITIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE
LUCAS
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
limiting defendant's irrelevant and repetitive cross-examination
of Detective Lucas.
A.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court's decision to limit
cross-examination under the abuse of discretion standard.

State

v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah App. 1988) ("The trial judge has
discretion to limit examination 'to preclude repetitive and
unduly harassing interrogation' or to prevent parties from
embarking on 'fishing expeditions'") (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial
court's abuse of discretion prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977) ("[slhould the
trial court err in unduly limiting the cross-examination such may
not be reversible error without a showing of prejudice").

See

also State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989), cert,
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015,
1017 (Utah 1978).
B. Defendant is Not Entitled to Unlimited
Cross-Examination
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall. 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court held:
[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose
reasonable limitations insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
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reasonable limits such on cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant.
Id. at 679.
Furthermore, in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974), the court held that cross examination is subject "to the
broad discretion of the trial judge to preclude repetitive and
unduly harassing interrogation . . . ." See also State v.
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Chestnut, 621
P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); Maestas. 564 P.2d at 1388
C
Defendant's Cross-Examination of
Detective Lucas
Defendant conducted an extensive cross-examination of
Detective Lucas.

Specifically, defendant asked questions about

the nature of undercover work and the methods Detective Lucas
used to obtain evidence.

Detective Lucas informed the jury that

occasionally he would make "deals" with informants for
information.
Defendant specifically asked Detective Lucas about how
he dealt with certain situations:
MS. REMAL: Now, in relation to your
undercover narcotics activity, you would
sometimes use other people to assist you in
participating in drug transactions; is that
right?
DET. LUCAS: Very seldom.
MS. REMAL: Well, what I mean by that is,
that you would sometimes use other
individuals who were giving you confidential
information or assisting you in some way in
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identifying people with whom you wanted to
deal?
DET. LUCAS: In my particular situation, no.
If I was to use a confidential informant, it
was very rare.
MS. REMAL: How many confidential informants
would you estimate you used over the three
years?
DET. LUCAS: Well, in the undercover
capacity, in the first round-up, they
insisted that I be involved with one
confidential informant for experience. Other
than that, there was none in a year and a
half. In the second group of people which
the defendant is involved in, there may have
been one or two that would recognize me from
court that were brought into officials and
they were convinced to cooperate as far as
identifying or some other. As far as used
out in the field for introduction, none of
them were used for that.
MS. REMAL: You received information from
persons which you would then tip, if you
will, that you would then investigate,
correct?
DET. LUCAS: Correct.
MS. REMAL: And sometimes those tips from
other individuals would result in some
benefit to those individuals, correct?
DET. LUCAS: I couldn't say that because I am
not real familiar with what happened to those
individuals. When I did come across someone
like this that would recognize me, we would
almost immediately enter into some type of
agreement with them to console them because
the utmost importance here was to preserve my
identity. In other words, if they were to go
on the street and tell people who I was, it
would be over and the scope of the
investigation was much broader than that one
individual. So we were pretty much willing
to do anything we had to with one person to
preserve the integrity of the entire
investigation.
26

MS. REMAL: And when you say you would do
something with a person like that to console
them, you mean you or someone involved in law
enforcement or the prosecuting agency would
make it worth their while in some way,
correct?
DET. LUCAS:
that.

I would say that is fair to say

MS. REMAL: And the types of things that
would make it worth their while would be that
individuals like that might not be charged
with crimes which they would otherwise have
been charged with? Might that be one way?
DET. LUCAS: It may. That is not my
decision. That is the County Attorney's
decision.
(R. 413-15) (emphasis added).
Defendant then asked, "[a]nother possible way would be
if those individuals were already charged with something, the
charges might be dismissed or decreased in severity?" (R. 415).
This question is essentially identical to the prior question (R.
414-15).

The court sustained the State's objection to this

question without comment (R. 415). Later, the court stated that
it sustained the objection because "that line of questioning was
too far removed from the facts of this particular case for it to
be relevant . . . " (R. 4 93).
This ruling was proper since Detective Lucas testified
that he did not normally use confidential informers (R. 413).
Furthermore, no informant testified in this case and there was no
evidence suggesting that Detective Lucas utilized an informant in
this case (R. 413). Given the lack of an informer, and Detective
Lucas's testimony concerning his infrequent use of informants,
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the trial court correctly ruled that any further questioning of
Detective Lucas about hypothetical informants would have no
relevance to defendant's case.
Moreover, since the trial court could have sustained
the State's objection based on the question's repetitiveness,
this Court may affirm that decision on that basis.

State v.

Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App. 1993).
D. Any Error Was Harmless Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
The trial court properly exercised its discretion by
not allowing irrelevant and repetitive questioning of Detective
Lucas.

However, if this Court finds that the trial court abused

its discretion by not allowing further questioning, that error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), the
supreme court found that the exclusion of further questioning on
cross-examination was error, but was not prejudicial because the
evidence would not have the substantial influence of changing the
verdict.

The court held, "[w]here it is unlikely that the

excluded testimony prejudiced the defendant's rights in a
substantial manner, the error is harmless and the case is not
subject to reversal." Id. at 500.
In assessing prejudice, the supreme court has held,
"[c]ourts have found no prejudice where information that may be
brought out by further questioning was already before the jury
either from the testimony of others or by implication from the
witness' own testimony."

Maestas, 564 P.2d at 1389; see also
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State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1982) (where basic
facts are available to jury any error in limiting crossexamination harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 232 (Utah 1980) (no error where "defendant
was able to elicit the kind of testimony he now claims he was
prevented from obtaining").

In Maestas, the court found that

there was no prejudice in not allowing further cross examination
because the jury was aware of the witnesses possible motivation
and additional cross examination would not have helped the jury
in determining credibility. Id.
As demonstrated above, the information defendant sought
to elicit from Detective Lucas regarding informants was already
before the jury.

Furthermore, Detective Lucas testified that he

rarely used informants and there was no evidence of an informant
in this case.

Therefore, any error by the trial court was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly exercised its discretion by
refusing to excuse Mr. Scholle for cause.

Prior employment as a

police dispatcher is insufficient to raise an inference of bias.
Furthermore, the trial court determined that Mr. Scholle answered
truthfully when he asserted that this prior employment would not
affect his impartiality.
Defendant cannot complain about the introduction of
evidence he elicited on cross-examination.
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By questioning

Detective Lucas on this issue he opened the door to its
introduction.
The trial court properly limited irrelevant and
repetitive cross-examination.

The question defendant wanted to

ask duplicated a question that had been asked and answered.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the jury's
determination of guilt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/

day of January, 1994

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first class mail
to

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN and LISA J. REMAL, Salt Lake Legal

Defender Association, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /_
January, 1994.

30

day of

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CORRECTION SHEET

vs.
MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS
Defendant

Case No. 921901734 FS

On Tuesday, March 16, 1993, the above-entitled cause of
action came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah.
CORRECTION
Page 68, Line 13 (According to reporter's notes should read.)
"THE COURT:

Do you think that experience, Mr. Scholle,
that you described would prevent you from
being fair and impartial if you were a juror
in today's case?

MR. SCHOLLE:

It wouldn't affect my opinion.
(NOT:

It would affect my opinion.)

c^SXi
Dor.othy L. Tr^pp
Cotitt ReportsO f f i c ital
a l Coxttt
License No. 74-1801-8
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ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM C

B.

This Court Should Require the Defendant
to Prove Prejudice Where the Seated Jury
Was Fair and Impartial.

A recent line of Utah cases holds that the error is
prejudicial per se when a party moves to strike a prospective
juror for cause, the strike is erroneously denied, and the party
exercises a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective juror.
See, e.g., Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451; State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22,
25 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981);
Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536

(Utah 1981); State v.

Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d
799, 802-03

(Utah 1977) .

This rule was announced by Justice

Ellett in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975).
This Court should abandon the Crawford v. Manning rule
for at least three reasons.

First, Justice Ellett announced the

rule without authority or persuasive analysis and thereby departed without
cases.

acknowledgment

from a line of well-reasoned Utah

Second, the rule has been rejected by the United States

Supreme Court and a majority of the states.

Third, the rule

permits needless and wasteful reversals where, as here, a defendant suffers no actual prejudice.
History of the Rule.

From territorial times to 1975,

Utah did not presume prejudice.

In People v. Hopt. 4 Utah 247, 9

P. 407 (1886), aff'd 120 U.S. 430 (1887), a death penalty case,
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah held that a "perfect
answer" to defendant's claim of prejudicial error in jury selec-
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tion was that, of the three jurors challenged, two were peremptorily dismissed and the third might have been, since defendant did
not exhaust his peremptory challenges.

9 P. at 408. Hence, "the

defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling."

Id.

On writ of error, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed.

Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, (1887).

The Court held

that any error in denying defendant's challenges for cause was
harmless.

"Those jurors were not on the jury, and impartial and

competent jurors were obtained in their place, to whom no objection was made." Id. at 436.
In State v. Thome, 41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286

(1912),

another death penalty case, this Court rejected a defendant's
claim that prejudice should be presumed where he exhausted his
peremptory challenges and was compelled to remove a biased juror
peremptorily.

This Court stated: "To follow such a course is to

lose sight of the fact that all that one who is on trial for a
crime is entitled to is a fair and impartial jury, and that the
right of challenge is given for the sole purpose of reaching that
result."

41 Utah at 427, 126 P. at 291.
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563 (1924), another

death penalty case, followed this rationale.

There, "the objec-

tionable jurors were all eliminated from the panel, and did not
sit in the trial of the case.

It is quite clear," the Court

concluded, "that no prejudice resulted from any of the court's
rulings in that regard."

64 Utah at 101, 228 P. at 568.
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Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 Utah 189, 186
P.2d 293 (1947),

devoted 38 West reporter column-inches to dis-

cussing this question.

The Court concluded:

The right of a party to challenge for cause
is given for the purpose of permitting litigants to obtain a fair and impartial trial by
an unbiased jury.
The right to challenge
peremptorily is given to permit a litigant
some latitude in removing jurors who are not
disqualified for cause yet are objectionable
to the challenging party.
While the law
permits some choice in the selection, it does
not permit a litigant to have his case heard
by a jury of his own choosing. The law seeks
to afford both litigants a fair trial. If
the jury as finally selected meets the test
of being a fair and impartial jury, then the
litigants have not been denied their fundamental right.
112 Utah at 199, 186 P.2d at 298 (emphasis added).

The Court

intimated that the defendant might have been able to show prejudice by demonstrating that the peremptory used on the partial
juror would have been used to remove "some other objectionable
juror . . . " 186 P.2d at 296.
In Crawford v. Manning, a 1975 one-page opinion in a
civil case, without discussion or serious analysis, the Utah
Supreme Court abandoned this line of well reasoned cases.

The

plaintiffs exercised one of three allotted peremptory challenges
to remove a venireperson who should have been removed for cause.
The jury unanimously found against the plaintiff.
Justice Ellett wrote,

In reversing,

"The juror which remained because the

plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have been a hawk
amid seven doves and imposed his will upon them."
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542 P.2d at

1093,

Justice Ellett ignored the prior line of cases noting that

the purpose of challenges

for cause

is to exclude "hawks."

Jurors passed for cause without objection are neither hawks nor
doves, but impartial.
District Judge Baldwin, writing by assignment in State
v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977), followed Justice Ellett and
held that "the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus
require a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the
juror was prejudicial."

JEd. at 630.

Judge Baldwin viewed the

error as prejudicial because "in effect it deprived defendant of
one of his statutory peremptory challenges . . . "
Judge
error.

Baldwin's

rationale

confuses

Ld. at 631.
prejudice

with

Establishing prejudice requires an appellant to show a

reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d

Showing that a party was deprived of

a peremptory challenge proves error only; it does not demonstrate
that the error resulted in a different trial outcome.

Indeed,

where the impartial juror was removed with a peremptory, the
defendant has cured the prejudice.11
Post-Moore

cases restated

justification or rationale.
lished."

the rule without

further

By 1983, the rule was "well estab-

See State v. Lacev, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1983).

11

Failure to do so should be looked upon as waiver analogous to failure to mitigate damages in the civil context.
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U.S. Supreme Court and Other States.

The right to an

impartial jury guaranteed by the United States Constitution does
not require a rule of per se prejudice.

In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487

U.S. 81, (1988), the United States Supreme Court examined this
issue on facts analogous to the case at bar.12
ject [ed]

The Court "re-

the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge

constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury."

487 U.S. at 88.

It held, "So long as the jury that

sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the
Sixth Amendment was violated.
436 (1887); . . . "

I&.

See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430,

Interestingly, the Court placed primary

reliance upon its opinion in Hopt, which affirmed the seminal
Utah case on the subject.13
A majority of states follow the Ross approach or otherwise require an aggrieved party to affirmatively demonstrate
prejudice.

Sharp v. State, 837 P.2d 718, 723 (Alaska App. 1992);

12

In a capital murder trial, the defendant exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been
excused for cause. The defense expended all of its peremptory
challenges. None of the jurors who actually sat was challenged
for cause by defense counsel. 487 U.S. at 83-84. Oklahoma law
requires defendants to "use [peremptory] challenges to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court to excuse jurors for cause."
id. at 90.
13

No case has ever suggested that the Utah Constitution
mandates Justice Ellett's rule. Since partial jurors are excludable for cause, Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e), a jury passed for cause
is by definition impartial, which is all the Utah Constitution
requires. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("the accused shall have
the right to . . . trial by an impartial jury").
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Pickens v. State. 783 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Ark. 1990), cert, denied.
110 S.Ct. 3257 (1990); People v. Johnson. 842 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal.
1992), petition for cert, filed. (May 20, 1993) (No. 92-8822). ;
State v. Pellettier. 552 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1989); Dawson v. State.
581 A.2d 1078, 1094 (Del. 1990), vacated on other grounds. 112
S.Ct. 1093 (1992); Trotter v. State. 576 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1990);
State v. Graham. 780 P.2d 1103, 1108 n.3 (Haw. 1989); State v.
Ramos. 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991); People v. Harris. 596 N.E.2d
1363, 1365-66 (111. App. 1992), appeal denied bv. 606 N.E.2d 1231
(1992); Vauahn v. State. 559 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1990); State
v. Mavberrv. 807 P.2d 86, 98 (Kan. 1991); Williams v. Commonwealth. 829 S.W.2d 942, 943

(Ky. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.

Susi. 477 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. 1985); Poet v. Traverse Citv
Osteopathic Hospital. 445 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Mich. 1989); Mettetal
v. State. 615 So.2d 600, 603 (Miss. 1993); Thompson v. State. 721
P.2d 1290, 1291 (Nev. 1986); State v. Adcock. 310 S.E.2d 587, 594
(N.C. 1983); State v. Blue Thunder. 466 N.W.2d 613, 620 (S.D.
1991); Ferrell v. State. 475 P.2d 825, 828

(Okla. Crim. App.

1970); State v. Pettit. 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. App. 1984), review
denied. 683 P.2d 91 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ingram. 591 A.2d 734,
739 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied. 606 A.2d 901 (1992);
State v. Barnville. 445 A.2d 298, 301

(R.I. 1982); State v.

Green. 392 S.E.2d 157 (S.C.), cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 229 (1990);
State v. Middlebrooks. 840 S.W.2d 317, 329 (Tenn. 1992), cert,
granted. 113 S.Ct. 1840 (1993); Jones v. State. 833 S.W.2d 118,
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123 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992), cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993);
State v. Santelli. 621 A.2d 222, 224 (Vt. 1992); State v. Noltie.
786 P.2d 332, 334-35

(Wash. App. 1990), affirmed 809 P.2d 190

(1991); State v. Travlor, 489 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Wis. App. 1992),
rev, denied. 491 N.W.2d 768 (1992); Lee v. State. 743 P.2d 296
(Wyo. 1987).
A minority take an approach similar to Crawford v.
Manning, sometimes by statute, although most require that the
aggrieved party exhaust all peremptories before prejudice will be
found.

See Boldin v. State. 585 So.2d 218, 222 (Ala. Cr. App.

1991); People v. Macrander. 828 P.2d

234, 244

(Colo. 1992);

Hutcheson v. State. 268 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1980); State v. Wacaser.
794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990); State v. Isiah. 781 P.2d 293, 302
(N.M. 1989); People v. Nicolas. 567 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (A.D. 2
Dept. 1991); State v. Tvler. 553 N.E.2d 576, 586-87 (Ohio 1990),
cert, denied. Ill S.Ct. 371 (1990); Gosling v. Commonwealth. 376
S.E.2d 541, 544

(Va. App. 1989); State v. Bennett. 382 S.E.2d

322, 325 n.2 (W. Va. 1989).
Proposed

Rule. The State proposes

a return to the

original Utah rule: where an empaneled jury was impartial, this
Court should require the defendant to prove prejudice as in all
other cases of non-constitutional error.

Prejudice may be demon-

strated only by showing that exercise of the lost peremptories
would have created "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result . . ."

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987).
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Factors

to consider

in determining

prejudice might

include the ratio of "lost" peremptories between the prosecution
and the defense, the articulable objectionable characteristics of
the juror or jurors forced upon defendant,14 and the strength of
the state's case.

Thus, in a close case, a defendant who was de-

prived of a relatively large number of peremptories that he would
have exercised against demonstrably prosecution-oriented jurors
might demonstrate prejudice.
Justice Ellett's rule invites needless and wasteful
reversals.

The Strickland-Knight-Verde standard of prejudice is

fair and rational.

Where a defendant cannot demonstrate at least

a reasonable likelihood that an error has affected the trial
outcome, the justice system should not be required to engage in a
costly retrial.

The instant case illustrates the vagaries of

this rule in application.
Assuming error in the court's refusal to exclude one or
more jurors for cause, reversing this case under Justice Ellett's
per se prejudice rule would be ironic for several reasons.

14

Peremptory challenges are generally used for three
purposes: (1) to remove jurors believed to be biased where forcause strikes were denied (for example, the successfully rehabilitated juror); (2) to remove members of groups counsel perceives
to be defense-prone (artists, students) or prosecution-prone (accountants, military); and (3) to remove jurors for intuitive or
unexplainable reasons (hunch, lack of rapport, unexplainable
aversion). See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination
in Jury Selection:
Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 Colum. L. Rev.
725, 762-64 (1992) . A defendant who lost the opportunity to
strike a juror in category (1) would be more likely to show harm
than one who lost the opportunity to strike a juror in category
number (3).
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First, the challenged prospective jurors never sat.
Second, the seated jurors passed two separate voir dire
examinations.

After the prosecution completed its case in chief

and the defense completed 19 of its 22 witnesses, one juror
received an anonymous note and another suffered an emotional
episode (T. 2367, 2396).

The trial court excused these jurors,

substituted alternates, and conducted searching individual in
camera voir dire examinations of the remaining jurors to ensure
that they had not been tainted (T. 2428-73).

This jury was fair

and impartial.15
Third, four of the five venirepersons at issue were
challenged for their alleged death penalty beliefs; yet the jury
did not decide the penalty phase.
Fourth, where a trial court refuses to ask venirepersons whether they would automatically impose the death penalty, with the result that one or more such death-prone persons may
actually serve on the jury, a defendant receiving a death sentence is entitled only to resentencing, not a new trial.

Morgan

v. Illinois. 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2235 n.ll (1992); State v. Norton,
15

Defendant passed for cause 13 of the 14 jurors and alternates who actually sat (R. 944-45, T. 290-309, 421-28, 472-79,
481-92, 523-33, 558-66, 585-93, 597-604, 696-705, 713-25, 76673, 840-53, 873-84).
Defendant's for-cause challenge of the
fourteenth juror, Kathy Rosenkrantz, was based on her statement
that, while she might not "vote for the death penalty just to
ensure that the person was not ever released from prison," "that
would be a factor that [she] would look at in deciding between
death and life" (Tr. 870) . The court denied the challenge (Tr.
872-73) and defendant did not peremptorily strike juror Rosenkrantz or appeal the court's ruling.
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675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984).
Yet here, where the allegedly death-prone jurors never sat, and
the trial jurors were incontestably impartial, defendant seeks to
overturn his conviction.
Fifth, the State's case against defendant was strong.
And sixth, there is no reason to beli€»ve that any
impartial but prosecution-prone jurors were forced upon defendant
through the loss of peremptory challenges.
In sum, defendant seeks to reverse a conviction returned by impartial

jurors because of opinions expressed by

panelists who never sat on a subject the jury never considered.
That Justice Ellett's rule in Crawford v. Manning would permit
this absurd result is sufficient reason to overrule it.
Absent actual, demonstrable prejudice, this case should
not be reversed for denial of defendant's for-cause strikes even
if the court did commit error, which it did not.
POINT 3
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY MISTRIAL MOTION BASED ON
TIM LARRABEE'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY DENIED
A.

Defendant Waived This Issue at Trial.

Larrabee testified on cross-examination that he picked
someone other than defendant out of a lineup, albeit with hesitation (T. 1277-78).16

On re-direct he testified that after the

16

Without his glasses, defendant was difficult to pick out
of the lineup (see St. Ex. 18).
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ADDENDUM E

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY

REED RICHARDS

CAROL CLAWSON
Solicitor General

JOHN F. CLARK
Counsel to the Attorney Genera!

GENERAL

Chief Deputy Attorney General

PALMER DEPAULIS
Director of Public Policy & Communications

December 8, 1993
Mr. Robert K. Heineman
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

State of Utah v. Maximo Ramon Ramos
Case No. 930305-CA

Dear Mr. Heineman:
Enclosed is a copy of the court reporter's correction to
the transcript in this case which she filed with the Court of
Appeals. Since you have indicated that this correction will not
affect your brief, I will follow the stipulated briefing schedule
and file my brief by January 10, 1994.
Sincerely,

RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
REC/rha
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